Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Self-Knowledge – Brie Gertler – Google Books
On this view, we ascertain our own thoughts by looking outward, to the states of the world they represent. Stephen Hetherington – – Oxford University Press. But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes knowlfdge from knowledge in other realms.
Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after bgie lengthy discussion of the results.
At the next moment, she feels only very slightly warmer than at the previous moment; but since she felt barely cold at the previous bri, at this later moment she may not, in fact, feel cold. This self-conception is also a conception of oneself as rationalas a thing that believes and intends etc. How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? I begin with Burge, who maintains that our responsibility for our beliefs entitles us to self-attributions.
This would quickly lead to a regress, which could be blocked only by positing a knowleddge that somehow comprehends itself. We can generate an even more plausible thesis by limiting this restricted infallibility claim to pains and other sensations. In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.
Statement 1 identifies the distinctive feature of self-knowledge as the epistemic status of geertler certain class of beliefs, whereas statement 2 identifies it by the method one uses in forming these beliefs. The first-person authority view diagnoses the authority granted to self-attributions in non-epistemic terms.
So we do have the epistemic right to that assumption. Brie Gertler btie mastered the subject matter, has thought it through acutely, and shares her excellent understanding in lucid, readable prose.
In particular, we are obligated to try to satisfy certain rational norms: This graph knoeledge both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links. Google Books no proxy Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy.
The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy seld mind and epistemology. Shoemaker presents three main arguments to show that self-blindness is impossible in a rational creature. We now consider the prospects for agentialism generally.
George Allen and Unwin. Sign in Create an account. Peacocke argues that, in a broadly similar way, a conscious judgment that p can serve as a direct reason for my self-attributing the belief that pwithout my having any distinct awareness of that judgment.
Still, the objection exposes a limit to transparency accounts: Doubts about neo-expressivism center on the question whether it truly explains knowledge of our mental states.
Self-Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Self-knowledge is especially secure, epistemically. The monitoring mechanism involved in inner sense must form representations of the mental states it takes as input.
Even if they are so triggered, and the process creates a new belief, the self-attributions may nonetheless qualify as knowledge about what one believes at the time of the self-attribution.
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Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Williamson imagines a subject who feels cold at dawn, but gradually warms until she feels warm at noon. To answer this objection, acquaintance theorists will concede that we can be wrong about our own phenomenal states. Abstract How does one know one’s own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Bruce Aune – – Routledge. Monthly downloads since first upload.
And subjective justification for a belief must be available to the thinker, and recognizable as her subjective justification. Aug 31, Matt rated it really liked it Shelves: To ask other readers questions about Self-Knowledgeplease sign up.
Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Lisa Thomas marked it as to-read Jun 01, A Defense of Empiricism Brie Gertler. The central phenomenon that neo-expressivism seeks to explain is first-person authority: Neo-expressivists allow that these practices, while standard, admit of exceptions. Other Internet Resources Philpapers. The notion that inner observation is the special method by which we achieve self-knowledge is knnowledge to the acquaintance and inner sense accounts see 3.